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It is commonly assumed that the current direction of economic change is detrimental 
to such collective industrial relations actors as employers’ associations. Adopting a 
crossnationally comparative perspective, this paper examines how employers’ associa-
tions cope with this challenge. This is done in two ways. On the one hand, the impact 
of economic change on membership strength is tested against the impact of industrial 
relations institutions that embed collective action. On the other hand, the paper ana-
lyzes how the employers’ associations have actively tried to adjust themselves to the 
changing conditions. 
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Ein internationaler Vergleich 
Es ist davon auszugehen, dass der gegenwärtige ökonomische Wandel die Probleme 
kollektiven Handelns, wie sie sich Arbeitgeberverbänden stellen, verschärft. Auf der 
Grundlage eines internationalen Vergleichs untersucht dieser Aufsatz, wie Arbeitge-
berverbände auf diese Herausforderung reagieren. Dabei werden zum einen die Aus-
wirkungen des ökonomischen Wandels im Verhältnis zum Einflussgewicht institutio-
neller Faktoren auf die Mitgliederstärke der Arbeitgeberverbände analysiert. Zum an-
deren wird der Frage nachgegangen, welche Anpassungsstrategien angesichts der ver-
änderten Rahmenbedingungen von den Arbeitgeberverbänden eingeschlagen werden. 
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1. Introduction 
A multiplicity of economic developments has brought about significant change in the 
context of industrial relations. These developments include technological advances, in-
ternationalization and globalization of markets and capital, and manifold other 
changes in production systems, work organization, the sectoral and occupational 
structure of the economy, and macroeconomic policy. It is commonly assumed that 
the direction of all these changes is detrimental to the collective actors in industrial re-
lations (i.e. unions and employer associations). This detrimental effect is most evident 
in the case of economic internationalization which at the same time represents the 
driving force behind most of the other developments mentioned. The dynamics of 
economic change have mainly been propelled by the expansion of internationalized 
markets which in turn have given rise to intensified competition both within and 
across countries. This poses a serious challenge to collective actors, since market 
competition is at odds with the solidaristic principle of collective action: To the extent 
that economic change both expands and intensifies market competition, it threatens to 
undermine the individual actors’ willingness to associate. 
While these processes challenge all collective actors in industrial relations, one 
may assume that employer associations are hit more than the unions. This follows 
from employers’ special kind of constituency. Companies that are potential members 
of employer associations are much more empowered than any other actor in society to 
respond to economic change individually and autonomously from associational action. 
For associations like employer organizations, the integration of their (potential) 
membership is a complex phenomenon that relates to several dimensions of compli-
ance, namely joining the association, paying the fees and acting in accordance with the 
association’s goals and decisions. The economic challenge delineated above most seri-
ously affects the basic dimension of compliance, that is, membership as such. If it is 
true that economic change makes employer associations less important to advancing 
employer interests, then the subjectively perceived ratio of costs and benefits regard-
ing membership tends to deteriorate. Affiliated employers are likely to leave and newly 
established companies will probably not join. 
This paper examines how the employer associations cope with this challenge. 
This analysis is based on a comparison of 20 OECD countries (Table 1). First of all, 
this requires analyzing the development of their membership strength and the deter-
minants of this development. Hence, the paper’s following section elaborates the hy-
potheses and measures for this analysis. After this, the data and findings are presented. 
For a full understanding of the development of employer associations, we also need to 
know whether and how they have tried to adjust themselves to the changing economic 
conditions. This is the issue of the next section.1 The paper concludes by discussing 
the implications these findings have for the future of employer associations.  
                                                          
1  Put in epistemological terms, the (quantitative) analysis of membership deals with the 
„causes“ of the observed development of employer associations, whereas the (qualitative) 
study of their adjustment strategies addresses the „reasons“ for this development. 
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2. Hypotheses and measures 
First of all, we have to operationalize the dependent variable: employer associations 
and their membership strength. Employer organizations are understood as associa-
tions aimed at representing labour market interests, in contrast to interests which 
business has in other markets. This definition includes „pure” employer associations 
(specialized exclusively in labour market interests) and „mixed” associations (organiz-
ing both labour market interests and other business interests). Membership strength is 
measured as associational density (i.e. the ratio of actual to potential members). There 
are two measures of employer density, referring to either the firms themselves or the 
firms’ employees (Traxler et al. 2001). The power of an employer association as com-
pared to its union counterparts depends less on the number of firms than on the 
number of employees covered. Hence, measuring employer density in terms of em-
ployees is preferable.  
Data on employer density are sparse. At the same time, employer associations are 
numerous. Even in the case of small countries like Portugal and the Netherlands esti-
mates suggest that several hundred exist. For this reason, our analysis of density is 
confined to a country’s principal (i.e. largest) employer peak organization whose for-
mal membership domain is country-wide and cross-sectoral. Peak organizations are 
independent in that they are not subordinate to any other employer association. Em-
ployer density (LED) is defined as the proportion of employees organized by the larg-
est employer peak within its own domain, understood as formal eligibility for mem-
bership laid down in the peak’s constitution. In line with this operationalization, all of 
the above associational measures but interassociational fragmentation (ESYS) refer to 
the principal employer peak.2  
In line with the general argument outlined above, the ongoing direction of eco-
nomic change is expected to erode member support. Accordingly, the quantitative 
analysis should show a statistically negative impact of economic change on density. 
However, there is an alternative hypothesis, emphasizing the relevance of (non-
market) institutions that embed associational action. The argument is that institutions 
can defy competitive pressures due to market imperfections (North 1990). This means 
that associations may be able to maintain member support despite unfavourable eco-
nomic conditions, when being backed by strong institutions that enable them to over-
come their collective action problems (Traxler et al. 2001). This implies that the level 
and the development of employer density should significantly vary with institutional 
configurations. We will thus test a convergence thesis (predicting a general decline in 
member support across countries as a result of economic change) against a path-
dependency thesis (assuming continued diversity of density due to differing institu-
tions). In contrast to numerous studies of union density, comparable analysis of em-
ployer density is rare. The following specification of hypotheses thus draws from col-
lective action theory (Olson 1965), from findings on union density (as far as they are 
applicable to employers) and in particular from recent comparative research in em-
ployer associations (Traxler 2000a; Traxler et al. 2001; Traxler 2003). When revisiting 
                                                          
2  For a detailed operationalization of all measures, see the Appendix. 
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this literature, one finds two clusters of possible determinants of employer density that 
correspond with the two competing main theses outlined above.  
The first cluster addresses the economic context of associational action. As men-
tioned above with regard to economic change, this context embraces a multiplicity of 
distinct dimensions. Their impact on density varies with the respective interest group. 
For instance, work organization and the occupational structure of the economy are 
negligible in the case of employer associations, whereas they certainly affect the mem-
bership strength of the unions. We thus focus on those dimensions which are hy-
pothesized to be most important to employer associations: that is, economic interna-
tionalization, the sectoral composition of the economy and the size of the economy.  
One may argue that economic internationalization challenges employer associa-
tions even more than unions. Paradoxically at first glance, this is because economic in-
ternationalization creates opportunities rather than threats for the companies as a dis-
tinct class of actors in comparison to other categories of industrial relations actors. 
The reason for this is that internationalization of markets enhances the possibilities of 
cross-border mobility on the one hand, and that companies are superior to any other 
actor in terms of their capacity for cross-border mobility on the other hand. This 
growing capacity of the companies for cross-border mobility and their transnational 
presence in markets threaten to devaluate the benefits of associations whose domain is 
always limited in territorial respects. Moreover, growing possibilities of cross-border 
mobility tend to fuel the employers’ worldwide attempts to decentralize and/or de-
regulate industrial relations and to re-integrate them into the realm of their company. 
Since these tendencies question the role of employer organizations in industrial rela-
tions, their relevance for business may become increasingly dubious. Hence, the hy-
pothesis is that economic internationalization significantly damages employer density. 
Internationalization primarily takes place in product markets and financial markets. 
The standard indicator of a country’s internationalization of product markets is for-
eign trade dependence, defined as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of 
GDP (OPEN1). To measure financial internationalization, we use foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI), understood as inward plus outward investment as a percentage of 
GDP.  
The sectoral composition of the economy may affect employer associations in a 
way analogous to the unions (Visser 1991): manufacturing is likely to be the strong-
hold of employer associations, as compared to the service sector. Hence, there should 
be a positive relationship between the size of the manufacturing sector and density. 
Since there has been a long-term trend towards an expansion of the service sector 
relative to manufacturing across the OECD, this kind of economic change should also 
work to the disadvantage of employer associations. The size of manufacturing 
(MAN1) is measured as the share of the sector’s employees in the total number of a 
country’s employees.  
Aside from its sectoral composition, the sheer size of an economy is likely to in-
fluence density. Growing group size affects collective action negatively (Olson 1965). 
From the associations’ perspective, the strategy of maximizing membership may be 
less rational in large countries than in small ones (Wallerstein 1989), since a reasonably 
high number of members is sufficient for resourcing an association. In large countries, 
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this (absolute) number of members can be reached at lower density levels, compared 
to small countries. Since associations are normally forced to economize on resources, 
it is not rational for them to invest in increasingly expensive member recruitment be-
yond that absolute number of members required for effective action. Our measure of 
the size of the economy (DEP1) is the total number of a country’s employees.  
The second cluster of factors refers to the employers’ institutional context. As re-
gards those institutions which can contribute to solving the recruitment problems of 
employer associations, two categories of institutions are of utmost importance: the or-
ganizational structure of employer associations and mechanisms providing selective 
incentives for their members.  
Employer associations can attract potential members by tailoring their organiza-
tional structures as closely to their members’ immediate interests as possible. This in-
volves an association’s demarcation of domain and its decision-making procedures. 
The demarcation of domain defines the range of interests covered by an association. 
Encompassing domains induce associations to internalize highly heterogeneous inter-
ests. Under these conditions the interests of a certain member group will often be ne-
glected and filtered out in the course of internal interest aggregation and goal forma-
tion. Hence, encompassing domains create more problems for member recruitment 
than narrow domains do. Our measure of the scope of domains (i.e. the concentra-
tion/fragmentation of the associational system) is the number of national, cross-
sectoral employer associations (ESYS): The larger the number of associations, the nar-
rower their interest domain tends to be, because associations are forced to specialize 
in certain interests under these circumstances. Internal decision-making procedures 
are also important to member recruitment. An individual employer’s influence on the 
decision-making process decreases with growing centralization. This probably deters 
employers from joining an association. When measuring centralization, we focus on 
the employers’ rights and obligations in relation to higher hierarchical levels of goal 
formation (ECENF). The hypothesis is that employer density increases with interas-
sociational fragmentation (i.e. narrowly defined interest domains, indicated by a large 
number of associations) and with intra-associational decentralization.  
Selective incentives reward members and/or punish non-members. In principle, 
any associational service offered exclusively to members can work as a selective incen-
tive. In practise however, services may also be collective goods (from which also non-
members benefit) or a mixture of selective and collective goods. An example is the as-
sociational representation of members in labour court proceedings. The representa-
tion of the particular member involved is certainly a selective good. However, a basic 
ruling by the court in favour of the employer is also a collective good. To identify an 
association’s selective incentives, in-depth analysis of each single activity would be 
needed, something which is beyond a comparison of 20 countries. Instead, we take 
the range of an association’s representational activities vis-à-vis the state (EAP) as a 
yardstick for its service potential. The rationale of this measure is that an association 
can derive selective incentives from the provision of collective goods. For instance, an 
association’s participation in industrial policy may serve as the basis for faster and bet-
ter informing the members about related issues. Therefore, we expect density to in-
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crease with the range of state-related representational activities performed by the asso-
ciation.  
Employer associations can also derive selective incentives from bargaining with 
the unions. Strong unions induce the employers to associate because protection 
against labour’s collective action is a key function of employer associations. Incentives 
of this kind include such activities as advice on matters of industrial relations and fi-
nancial support in case of industrial disputes which employer associations will provide 
only for member companies. More generally, employer associations are designed to 
counter „whipsawing“ union tactics aimed at confronting each company individually.3 
Put in operational terms, employer density is assumed to grow with union density 
(UD1). 
Another selective incentive results from statutory provisions for extending multi-
employer collective agreements to those employers not affiliated to the signatory em-
ployer association (Gladstone 1984; Traxler 1998a). Given such practices, employers 
have good reason to believe that a collective agreement will bind them even when they 
stay outside the association. Hence, it is rational for them to associate so as to be enti-
tled to participate in the bargaining process the outcome of which may be binding on 
them in any case. We thus hypothesize that employer density increases with the perva-
siveness of extension (EXTP).  
3.  Data and findings 
As a consequence of the limited availability of comparable time series data on em-
ployer density, it is impossible to employ a pooled time-series design. Instead, this 
analysis adopts a cross-sectional approach, which compares two periods (i.e. 1986-
1990 and 1994-1996). For reasons of space, descriptive statistics are presented here 
only for the dependent variable, that is, density (Table 1). 
With 100 %, density is highest in Austria, since all firms in the WKÖ’s domain 
are legally required to be members. The WKÖ is the only principal employer peak re-
lying on obligatory membership. However, formally voluntary membership co-exists 
with informal mechanisms of compulsory member recruitment in several other coun-
tries. Most importantly, compulsory payment of dues, which comes closest to com-
pulsory membership, is institutionalized on the basis of sectoral-level collective bar-
gaining in Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain. For example, in Belgium’s textile in-
dustry, all employers are obliged to pay 1% of gross wages to a central fund primarily 
designed to finance payment of additional unemployment benefits to union members. 
This fund also sponsors the sector’s employer association, which keeps 5% of all con-
tributions for running its own organization (Blanpain 1998: 282). Under these circum-
stances, the employer associations – in cooperation with their union counterparts – 
are able to impose levies on non-members via legally based extension of collective 
                                                          
3  Notably, the power of these incentives tends to vary with employer groups, namely with 
firm size. This is not only because union density increases with firm size (Visser 1991). In 
addition, confronting each single firm probably overstretches even the power of strong 
unions, such that they will concentrate their whipsawing tactics on large companies. 
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agreements to unaffiliated firms. Given the obligatory payment of dues, employers 
have every reason to join their association. 
Table 1:  The largest employer peak organization: density (LED) 
Country Name LED* 
  1986-90 1994-96 
A WKÖ 100 100 
AUS CAI (1986–95), ACCI 62 75g 
B VBO/FEB  72 
CDN –– 0 0 
CH ZSAO, SAVc 39 37 
D BDA 73h 72h 
DK DA 38 39 
Ea CEOE 75 72 
F CNPFd 75 74 
FIN STK (1986–93), TT 42 44 
UK CBI  54 
I C 81 39 
IRL FUE, FIEe (1986–93), IBEC 36 39 
JP Nikkeiren 39 40g 
N NAF, NHOf 32 31 
NL VNO (1986–94), VNO-NCW  79 
NZ NZEF 90 90 
Pb CIP  34 
S SAF 54 55 
USA –– 0 0 
Mean  52.3 52.3 
*  Period means or most recent data 
a  Since 1977, b Since 1975, c ZSAO renamed in SAV in 1996, d CNPF renamed in MEDEF 
in 1998, 
e  FUE renamed in FIE in 1989, f NAF renamed in NHO in 1990, g 1997, h West Germany. 
 For definition of LED and abbreviations, see Appendix. 
 Data basis: Traxler et al. (2001). 
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Aside from Austria, the peaks of Australia, New Zealand, (West)Germany, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain record high density levels of more than 70%. 
Until the 1990s, Italy’s Confindustria also belonged to this group. The subsequent de-
cline in density results from an extension of its domain since 1991 from manufactur-
ing to services, where the level of membership lags behind that of manufacturing. 
Employer density is not outstanding in the Nordic countries. Two factors (as the fol-
lowing analysis will show) mainly account for this situation: extension practices do not 
exist in these countries except Finland. Furthermore, all Nordic peaks are character-
ized by extremely high centralization that makes them strong in terms of strategic ca-
pacity but negatively affects their membership strength. In Australia, the strong in-
crease in density from the early to the mid-1990s reflects the merger of the CAI and 
the Australian Chamber of Commerce to form the ACCI. 
Finally, the USA and Canada lack any form of employer peak associations. Below 
peak level, Canada records employer associations in a few sectors which differ consid-
erably in their role across the distinct provincial jurisdictions. 
The comparison of the two periods suggests high stability of employer density. 
With the exception of Italy and Australia, only slight changes took place, without par-
ticular trend. 
Turning now to the empirical examination of our hypotheses, we will leave out 
the case of Austria, since its principal peak relies on obligatory membership. To ad-
dress each single hypothesis, we begin with a cross-sectional design, based on bivariate 
correlations (Table 2). 
Table 2:  Economic and institutional correlates of employer density (LED) 
 1986-90 n 1994-96 n 
FDI 0.22 15 0.31 17 
OPEN1 -0.05 15 0.12 19 
MAN1 0.52 15 0.06 19 
LNDEP1 -0.15 15 -0.23 19 
EAP -0.21 13 -0.26 17 
ECENF -0.28 13 -0.47 17 
ESYS 0.41 13 0.12 17 
EXTP 0.59 15 0.44 19 
UD1 -0.01 15 -0.10 19 
 Pearson's correlation; n = number of cases 
 For the countries included, see Table 1; Austria generally omitted; Canada and the USA 
excluded with regard to EAP, ECENF and ESYS; Belgium and Portugal excluded with 
regard to FDI (1994-96). 
 For definition of the institutional variables, see Appendix. 
 
Most essentially, none of the two measures of economic internationalization has the 
expected relationship with density (LED). Foreign trade dependence (OPEN) is al-
most completely irrelevant. Foreign direct investment (FDI) affects density. However, 
this contrasts with the hypothesis in that density tends to increase with FDI. This sug-
gests that the transnational spread of market relations by economic internationaliza-
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tion does not undermine employer solidarity as demarcated by national boundaries. 
The effect of manufacturing (MAN1) is difficult to assess. This is because the two 
subperiods available strongly differ in the number of countries which is paralleled by 
differences in how the domains of the national peak associations relate to manufactur-
ing. We shall return to this issue when presenting the results of the multivariate analy-
sis. Among the factors related to the economic context of associational action, only 
the size of the economy (LNDEP1) shows a clear effect in line with the above as-
sumptions. 
Institutional factors (especially extension practices) are much more important 
than the economic context. All institutional factors except two are correlated with 
density in the hypothesized way.4 The two exceptions are associational participation in 
public policy (EAP) and union density (UD1). There is even a negative relationship of 
associational participation with density (LED). This indicates that associational par-
ticipation works primarily as a collective good from which selective incentives cannot 
systematically be extracted. The case of union density is more complex. Its (statistical) 
irrelevance is caused by such intervening variables as external, state-provided member-
ship incentives. Such incentives are essential to both employees and employers. The 
two sides of industry, however, differ in what external selective incentives matter: in 
the case of employees, the decisive incentives are union-led unemployment schemes 
(Ebbinghaus/Visser 1999; Traxler et al. 2001); for employers, the extension of collec-
tive agreements matters. What makes the density of employers and employees rather 
independent of one another is the fact that any establishment of these two types of in-
centives does not co-vary across countries. For instance, in most of the Scandinavian 
countries, union-led unemployment schemes exist but extension practice is completely 
lacking. This contributes to the clearly higher level of union density there, compared 
to the employers. The diametrically opposed pattern characterizes countries like 
France, Portugal, and Spain, where extension is pervasive and union-led unemploy-
ment schemes do not exist at all. In all these cases, employer density surpasses union 
density. Another intervening factor is product-market interests. When employer asso-
ciations are mixed, businesses may join for the mere reason of product-market inter-
ests, implying that unions are no incentive for employers to associate. This is exampli-
fied by the CBI. It has largely retained its density although industrial relations activities 
have receded into the background. In contrast, Britain’s lower-level employer associa-
tions lost around half of their density (in terms of establishments) over the 1980s 
(Millward et al. 1992), when multi-employer bargaining withered away. Hence, the 
CBI’s ability to attract members primarily comes from its role as a trade association 
that deals with product-market interests. 
One can infer from this that union density affects employer density most strongly 
in those countries where pure employer associations are established and where neither 
union-led unemployment schemes nor extension practice exist as the two key selective 
incentives for employees and employers. Testing this hypothesis encounters serious 
                                                          
4  To investigate the effect of centralization and associational participation on density, the 
USA and Canada must be left out, since there can be no effect caused by organizational 
structures, if employer associations do not exist. 
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problems. Above all, it is impossible to differentiate between mixed and pure em-
ployer peaks, because many affiliates – even of pure employer peaks – are mixed. 
Hence, we must exclude the functional differentiation of employer associations from 
our considerations. We can control only for selective incentives: there are seven coun-
tries where neither union-led unemployment schemes nor extension provisions are in 
operation (Ireland, Italy, Norway, the UK, Japan, Canada, and the USA). In line with 
our basic assumption, employer density is positively correlated with union density in 
the case of this subgroup of countries (r LED/UD1 = 0.34 [n = 7, 1994–1996]).  
To take account of this complex interplay of factors for the purpose of the multi-
variate analysis, we include the interaction of extension practices (which thus will be 
introduced as a dichotomized dummy variable, EXTPD) with union density 
(EXTPDxUD1). Taking into consideration that centralization (ECENF) and associa-
tional fragmentation (ESYS) have no meaningful score in the case of the USA and 
Canada, the mean for this variable was assigned to these countries. A dummy for the 
special case of New Zealand is also included in the model referring to the second pe-
riod under examination (i.e. 1994–1996). This is because of the lagged consequences 
of the 1993 reform of the industrial relations system. Until 1996 this reform led to no-
table changes, namely a decline in union density, the shift from multi- to single-
employer bargaining and the concomitant disappearance of extension practice. How-
ever, employer density which should decline in response to these changes according to 
our hypotheses, actually fell to a considerable extent only after the end of the focused 
period. In addition to the institutional factors noted above, manufacturing (MAN1) 
enters the model, since this it the only variable of economic change for which the 
bivariate analysis (Table 2) has at least shown the expected direction of influence.5 Ta-
ble 3 presents the findings of the multivariate analysis for both reference periods. 
There is the expected, significant effect of this variable for the first period. The 
same holds true for associational fragmentation (ESYS). All the other institutional 
variables show a significant impact on employer density over both periods in accor-
dance with the hypotheses: Growing intra-associational centralization of decision-
making significantly dampens the density ratio of employer associations. Furthermore, 
employer density is significantly higher in a situation of extension practices 
(EXTPD+), as compared to countries where such practices are absent. Employer den-
sity also significantly increases with union density (UD1+) in the case of absent exten-
sion practices. The negative coefficient of the interactive term (EXTPDxUD1) indi-
cates that union density even shows a strong negative association with employer den-
sity, if extension provisions are implemented. This means that extension provisions 
(when practiced) clearly dominate and overshadow union density as a determinant of 
employer density. 
                                                          
5  We exclude the other variables of economic change from the multivariate analysis not 
only because their bivariate correlations with employer density showed no consistend ef-
fect. In addition, one should not inflate the number of independent variables in a small-
sample situation. 
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Table 3:  The determinants of the level of employer density (LED) 
 1986-90 1994-96 
MAN1 1.93** 
[2.63] 
0.55 
[0.57] 
ECENF -9.66*** 
[-3.24] 
-10.28** 
[-2.81] 
ESYS 5.73*** 
[3.77] 
2.64 
[1.27] 
EXTPD+ 69.51*** 
[4.45] 
72.82*** 
[4.35] 
UD1+ 1.97*** 
[3.92] 
1.82*** 
[3.10] 
EXTPDxUD1 -1.03** 
[-3.08] 
-1.01** 
[-2.69] 
NZ --- 
--- 
37.31* 
[2.09] 
Constant -152.05*** 
[-4.86] 
-117.40** 
[-2.92] 
R2 0.76 0.55 
N 15 19 
F-Test 0.01 0.02 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.49 1.85 
 * p  0.10; ** p  0.05; *** p  0.01; R2 = adjusted coefficient of determination 
 Entries are OLS-coefficients in period-specific cross-section models; t-statistics in square 
brackets.  
 EXTPD+: extension practiced (absent extension is the reference category). 
 UD1+: union density if extension is absent. 
 EXTPDxUD1: interactive effect, indicating the differential impact of UD1, conditional 
on whether extension is practiced or not. 
 USA and CDN: values for ESYS and ECENF set to overall mean; Austria omitted; NZ: 
control for the special case of New Zealand (1994–96). 
 For variable definitions, see Appendix. 
 
The upshot of these findings is that employer density is predominantly shaped by its 
institutional context. Above all, the strong impact of extension practices (EXTPD) 
and union density (UD1) underpins the relevance of engagement of employer organi-
zations in labour relations in general and collective bargaining in particular. Put more 
succinctly, it is multi-employer bargaining which is central to the membership strength 
of employer associations, since extension provisions can be implemented only in con-
nection with multi-employer settlements. 
All in all, this analysis confirms other comparative studies of employer density 
which, however, differ in the set-up of the multivariate model and the measures of the 
institutional variables (Traxler et al. 2001, Traxler 2003). This suggests a high robust-
ness of findings. 
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4. The associational responses to the challenge of economic change 
The above analysis has shown that employer density is strongly influenced by institu-
tional factors, whereas the effect of economic conditions is rather negligible. Although 
we lack long-term data series on employer density, this finding suggests that economic 
change has not resulted in a membership crisis of employer associations. This, how-
ever, does not mean that there is not any effect of economic developments at all. 
Rather, the given institutions (including the employer associations themselves) have 
mediated these effects, implying that the magnitude of challenge, as posed by eco-
nomic change, varies with institutional configurations.6 This section gives an overview 
of what adjustment strategies the employer associations have adopted in order to off-
set the potentially detrimental effects of economic change on their level of member-
ship.  
As noted above, the essence of these detrimental effects is that economic change 
has qualified the benefits of associational membership in relation to its costs. Gener-
ally, this loss in benefits has been caused by the fact that the above economic devel-
opments have given rise to more or less accentuated tendencies towards decentraliza-
tion and deregulation of industrial relations across the OECD. These processes of de-
centralization and deregulation have in turn resulted in growing importance of the 
companies as compared to employer associations, when it comes to regulating the 
terms of employment. In principle, employer associations have had two basic options 
of coping with this challenge. First, they can offset this loss of benefits by mobilizing 
new incentives for membership. This option means functional adjustments to economic 
change. Second, employer associations can compensate for the loss in benefits by 
lowering the costs of membership, such that the ratio of costs and benefits does not 
alter significantly. This option relies on structural adjustments to economic change. 
Empirical evidence suggests that employer associations have resorted to both options, 
all the more since they represent complementary rather than alternative approaches.  
As far as functional adjustments are concerned, one notable strategy pursued by 
national peak associations has been to replace tasks directly related to collective bar-
gaining with functions of political lobbying. Comparative research in the development 
of collective bargaining has shown that in most countries decentralization of bargain-
ing has taken the form of a decay of central-level, interindustry bargaining (in favour 
of combined bargaining at sector and company level) rather than a radical move from 
multi- to single-employer bargaining (Traxler et al. 2001). As a consequence, bargain-
ing decentralization has most strongly questioned the role of the peak-level employer 
associations. In line with their all-encompassing, cross-sectoral domain, peak-level as-
sociations are designed to aggregate and represent the interests common to all groups 
of employers. In a context of central-level bargaining being in decline, it is rational for 
                                                          
6  The recent crisis of the German employer associations (e.g. Artus 2001; Schroe-
der/Ruppert 1996; Völkl 2002) fits well into this path-dependent mode of development. 
As union density has strongly declined as well as extension practices have always been 
limited and have even decreased since the mid-1990s, Germany meets key preconditions 
for a decline in membership of employer associations, seen from a comparative perspec-
tive (see Tables 2 and 3). 
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the national peak employer associations to re-orient their profile from bargaining is-
sues to tasks of political lobbying and campaigning that address the government and 
the public. An example of a profound re-orientation of this kind is Sweden’s SAF 
which withdrew from centralized bargaining in the early 1990s , while political opinion 
formation has strongly gained in importance (Pestoff 1995). Likewise, its French 
counterpart, CNPF, has underscored its shift in priorities from central-level bargaining 
to the political promotion of business interests by renaming itself in Mouvement des 
Entreprises de France (MEDEF) in 1998 (EIRO 1998).  
According to the categorization by Olson (1965), replacing collective bargaining 
tasks by lobbying activities is a case of functional adjustment that substitutes one cer-
tain collective good for another one. As peak associations not always interact directly 
with the company members covered under their umbrella, they have limited opportu-
nity to resort to the classical means of improving the benefits of associational mem-
bership: that is, the provision of selective incentives. For the above reasons, any sys-
tematic inquiry into the range and change in selective incentives offered by employer 
associations is beyond this study. We thus lack comparative information about the ex-
tent to which employer associations have responded to the challenges of economic 
change by extending the range of selective incentives. Regardless of this, this has 
probably not happened on a large scale. This is because offering more selective incen-
tives requires additional resources, something which conflicts with the very strong 
pressures to cut costs (see below). However, the example of New Zealand underpins 
that this strategy can be essential under certain circumstances (Traxler et al. 2001). The 
1991 deregulation of industrial relations has resulted in a significant move from multi-
employer bargaining to single-employer bargaining which forced the employer associa-
tions to undergo radical reforms as well. As the case study of the Auckland Employers 
Association demonstrates (Carrol/Tremewan 1993), employer organizations have 
done so by deliberate commercialization. While the association lost its bargaining 
tasks, it developed into a professional provider of services which are sold to members. 
Meanwhile, earnings from services exceed general membership fees which were re-
duced in the course of the reform. The case also illustrates that - under the given fi-
nancial constraints imposed on employer associations – the expansion of and the im-
provement in services is bound to making them payable. This in turn tends to convert 
the association from a genuine employer organization into a commercialized undertak-
ing. Such a strategy is feasible in response to a radical change in the industrial relations 
system, as happened in New Zealand. Another, more important strategy of functional 
adjustment has been to place more or new emphasis on representation of product 
market interests. In the case of pure employer associations this has often taken the 
form of mergers with trade associations specialized in product market interests. 
Among the 20 countries, Ireland, Norway, Portugal and, more recently, Sweden and 
Japan saw a shift of their principal employer peak association from the pure to the 
mixed status. One can observe analogous developments below peak level in several 
countries (e.g. Sweden).  
Mergers are aimed not only at functional adjustments in the sense of incorporat-
ing product market interests. Aside from this, they may also relate to structural ad-
justments, designed to curb costs and economize on resources. At peak level, such 
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merger happened in Finland, where the mixed employer peak, STK, combined with a 
trade peak association to form TT in 1993. In particular, structural adjustments by 
mergers involve the associations below peak level, since most synergy effects can be 
created when narrow associations combine to form more encompassing units. How-
ever, as the crossnational comparison reveals, it is not a strategy frequently used. For 
13 of the 20 OECD countries, data on the number of affiliates to the principal em-
ployer peak association are available. The fact that the average number of affiliates per 
peak association only slightly decreased from 86.5 in 1980 to 85.4 in 1996 indicates a 
very limited tendency to merge (Traxler et al. 2001). One explanation for this lies in 
the above finding that companies prefer narrow associations over more encompassing 
ones. In addition, the need to form special associations for newly emerging sectors has 
more or less offset the limited number of mergers. It should be noted, however, that 
the effectiveness of structural adjustments by mergers varies widely across countries. 
They are most thoroughgoing in the Scandinavian countries. For instance in Den-
mark, DA’s number of affiliates fell in less than one year from 150 to 51 (Traxler 
1998b).  
Other measures of structural adjustments include cuts in budgets, staff, dues and 
services. Sometimes, free services were made payable. At the peak level, such reforms 
took place in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden. As lowering mem-
bership dues are an especially effective means of improving the cost-benefit ratio of 
membership, these reforms have lead to substantial dues reductions in several cases. 
For instance, SAF’s annual budget has been reduced by more than 20 % in connection 
with a lowering of the subscriptions by almost 50 % (EIRR 1993:12). In connection 
with the formation of TT in Finland (see above), staff as well as dues have been re-
duced by one third. In 2000, Austria’s WKÖ decided to reduce the dues by 30 %.  
The massive dues reductions, as implemented in the above cases, can be taken as 
evidence of the enormous pressures which the members have imposed on their asso-
ciations to initiate reforms, primarily devised to economize on resources. These mem-
ber–driven pressures for lower dues are part of more general employer efforts to curb 
costs against a background of intensified competition which is certainly fuelled by 
economic internationalization. Hence, the employers’ organizational response to the 
challenge of economic change is not recourse to „exit” from their associations but to 
„voice” in the sense of attempts to modernize them. Put more specifically, it has pri-
marily been the group of larger companies which has so strongly pressed for reforms. 
In line with this, most of the reform measures outlined above are tailored to the inter-
ests of this group. In comparison to their smaller counterparts, large firms can more 
effectively draw advantage from the transfer of bargaining tasks to the company level 
in the course of bargaining decentralization; and they are less sensitive to cuts in ser-
vices and higher charges for them, as they are less in need of this kind of associational 
activities. The large firms have been able to enforce their interests due to their pre-
dominance in employer associations, which is normally endorsed in voting rights 
weighted according to the amount of dues paid, which is in turn linked to such criteria 
of firm size as employment and the wage sum.  
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5. Conclusions 
Despite economic changes detrimental to collective action employer associations have 
been able to adjust to these changes without a significant decline in membership 
strength. It should be noted, however, that this finding refers to membership strength 
in terms of employees covered. One important factor enabling the associations to pre-
serve density in terms of employees has been the special emphasis their adjustments 
have placed on the interests of large companies. As noted above, the large companies 
are essential to the associations’ membership strength because they account for most 
of the employees covered by peak associations. As an implication, employer associa-
tions may have been less able to maintain their capacity to integrate smaller compa-
nies, such that their density in terms of member firms may indeed have declined. 
At any rate, the associations have achieved success in more or less maintaining 
density in terms of employees at the expense of their traditional role in industrial rela-
tions. As far as their functional adjustments are concerned, employer associations have 
more or less re-oriented themselves towards representation of product market inter-
ests and political lobbying, while genuine bargaining tasks have been curtailed in par-
ticular at the peak level. The structural adjustments have led to cuts in resources which 
are likely to restrain their strategic capacity for collective action. One might, therefore, 
infer that employer associations have been weakened as a voice of business. Such con-
clusion, however, would be an over-generalization. Employer associations have be-
come weaker mainly in relation to their constituency, since powers in terms of bar-
gaining tasks as well as resources in terms of lower dues have been transferred to their 
members. But these adjustments do not translate into a corresponding weakness of ei-
ther employer associations or employers in relation to their labour counterpart. This is 
because the structural (i.e. pre-associational) power asymmetry that works in favour of 
employers in the labour market (Offe 1985) more than offsets this associational weak-
ness. Growing unemployment and growing internationalization of markets tend to in-
crease this asymmetry. Paradoxically, the weakening of employer associations even 
tends to become converted into a strategic advantage in their negotiations with un-
ions, since the bargaining party less interested in an agreement and less capable of 
binding its members obtains the stronger bargaining position (Elster 1989). 
Furthermore, the above analysis has provided strong evidence that the employers’ 
propensity to associate is still shaped almost exclusively by the institutional context. 
This context in turn is determined by the properties of the nation state: extension 
practices, union density, the associational system of employers and the degree of cen-
tralization of the principal employer peak all vary considerably across countries. 
The extraordinary relevance of extension practices (which have proved the most 
powerful single correlate of employer density; Table 2) for the density level of em-
ployer associations underscores that the associations’ ability to cope with economic 
change and maintain their membership strength strongly depends on external condi-
tions. Put more specifically, the fate of employer associations is closely linked to the 
fate of multi-employer bargaining to which extension practices are referring. It is no 
mere coincidence that employer associations have seen the strongest erosion of mem-
bership in those two countries where single-employer bargaining replaced multi-
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employer bargaining as the prevalent type of collective bargaining: In the UK, sectoral 
employer associations have withered away; density of New Zealand’s NZEF fell from 
90 % in terms of employees in 1991 to 67 % in 1998. 
Multi-employer bargaining is the core function of employer associations not only 
when it comes to integrating members. It is also the key to the associations’ role in 
public policy. As evidence from crossnational research shows, the range of participa-
tory rights of both employer associations and unions in the course of public-policy 
making is significantly higher when multi-employer bargaining prevails in a country’s 
industrial relations, as compared to predominance of single-employer bargaining 
(Traxler 2000b). The reason for this lies in the fact that – in stark contrast to single-
employer bargaining – multi-employer bargaining is so important in macroeconomic 
terms that there is a strong incentive for the state to seek cooperation with organized 
business and labour. Thus, if multi-employer bargaining fades away, then employer as-
sociations run the risk of suffering the same fate. 
Owing to supportive labour law, this risk has been contained so far in most coun-
tries by means of organized decentralization. Since organized approaches to bargain-
ing decentralization are devised to maintain the ability of multi-employer settlements 
to control the decentralization, they have been another factor stabilizing employer as-
sociations, aside from their functional and structural adjustments. 
However, the effectiveness of these adjustment strategies remains ambivalent. 
When solving problems in the short term, they may generate even more problems in 
the long run. Above all, employer associations may face a double dilemma in the fu-
ture. First, many of the ongoing adjustments, namely the cuts in staff and services 
serve the interests of large companies more than the interests of their smaller coun-
terparts which more strongly need individual support from their association. Hence, 
employer associations may face growing difficulties in integrating small and medium-sized 
enterprises. This, in turn, challenges their representativeness as the voice of business. 
Second, decentralization tendencies may become so overwhelming that multi-
employer bargaining loses control over this process and fades away. This would in-
duce the larger companies to leave the employer associations as well as undermine the 
associations’ macroeconomic importance and relevance for public policy-making. 
Appendix: operationalization of variables 
DEP1 Dependent employment, except for Germany (West Germany only). 
EAP Associational (employer) participation in state regulation (non-wage issues): aggregate in-
dex of activities listed below. Each generalized activity counts as 11; each specialized ac-
tivity counts as 1. The scale is standardized to the interval 0–1. 
 General activities 
 - Influences national government or parliamentary bodies with regard to labour-market  
   issues 
 - Represents members’ labour-market interests on national corporatist institutions 
 Specialized activities 
 Participation in the formulation of: 
 - Industrial policy programs 
 - Regional development programs 
 - Public occupational programs (including apprenticeship) and active labour-market  
    policy 
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 - Research and development programs 
 - Quality control programs and/or standardization of products 
 Implements or participates in implementation of: 
 - Industrial policy programs 
 - Regional development programs 
 - Public occupational programs (including apprenticeship) and active labour-market  
    policy 
 - Research and development programs 
 - Quality control programs and/or standardization of products 
ECENF Associational centralization: control of employer organizations over member firms under 
the umbrella of the largest peak. Formal control over member firms decreases when they 
are entitled to (1) obtain the status of a ‘non-conforming’ member generally not subject 
to collective agreements signed by the association; (2) conduct separate negotiations on 
its own when a collective agreement by the association is not in line with the firm’s inter-
est; (3) autonomously organize industrial action; (4) pay its employees more than the 
amount fixed by the collective agreement signed by the association. Aggregate index of 
items 1–4 each coded yes = –1, no = 0. Reference is to the most common pattern or the 
most influential affiliate in the case of intra-confederal variation.  
ESYS Interassociational fragmentation/concentration: number of national, cross-sectoral em-
ployer peak organizations covering at least two complete one-digit ISIC sectors. 
EXTP Practice of extending multi-employer agreements to employers unaffiliated to the bar-
gaining units, measured as the percentage of private-sector employees exclusively covered 
by extension. 1 = no notable extension practice, 2 = moderate practice (i.e. 5-25 % of all 
private-sector employees covered), 3 = pervasive practice. 
EXTPD Dichotomization of EXTP (see above): 
 0 = if EXTP is 1; 
 1 = if EXTP is 2 or 3 
FDI Foreign direct investment (inward and outward) as a percentage of nominal GDP in US 
Dollars. 
LED Density of the largest employer peak: percentage of employees organized by the peak 
within its domain, except for Germany (West Germany only). 
MAN1 Share of employees in manufacturing in the total number of employees., except for 
Germany (West Germany only).  
OPEN1 Foreign trade dependence (sum of exports and imports) as a percentage of GDP, except 
for Germany (West Germany only). 
UD1 Union density: gross or net density as defined and listed in Traxler et al. (2001) (gross 
density for Ireland, Japan and Switzerland; net density for the other countries). 
Data source: DEP1: OECD, Economic Outlook; FDI: IMF, Balance of Payment Statistics Year-
book; MAN1: OECD, Labour Force Statistics; OPEN1: OECD, National Accounts; all other 
variables: Traxler et al. (2001). 
Abbreviations 
a. Country Codes 
A Austria AUS Australia B Belgium 
CDN Canada CH Switzerland D Germany 
DK Denmark E Spain FIN Finland 
F France GB Great Britain IRL Ireland 
I Italy JP Japan NL Netherlands 
N Norway NZ New Zealand P Portugal 
S Sweden UK United Kingdom USA United States of 
America 
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b. Associations 
ACCI Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
BDA Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände  
C Confindustria 
CAI Confederation of Australian Industry 
CBI Confederation of British Industry 
CEOE Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales  
CIP Confederação da Indústria Portuguesa  
CNPF Conseil National du Patronat Français  
DA Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening  
FIE Federation of Irish Employers 
FUE Federated Union of Employers 
IBEC Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation 
NAF Norges Arbeidsgiverforening  
NHO Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon 
NZEF New Zealand Employers’ Federation 
SAF Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen  
SAV Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband 
STK Suomen Työnantajain Keskusliitto  
TT Teollisuus ja Työnantajat 
VBO/FEB Verband van Belgische Ondernemingen – Fédération des Entreprises Belgique  
VNO Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen  
VNO-NCW Vereniging van Nederlandse Ondernemers – Nederlands Christelijke Werksge-
versverbond 
WKÖ Wirtschaftskammer Österreich  
ZSAO Zentralverband Schweizerischer Arbeitgeber-Organisationen  
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